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ABSTRACT
Social animals are provisioned with pro-social orientations that operate to
transcend self-interest. Morality, as used here, describes human versions
of such orientations. We explore the evolutionary antecedents of morality in
the context of emergentism, giving considerable attention to the biological
traits that undergird awareness and our emergent human forms of mind.
We suggest that our moral frames of mind emerge from our primate prosocial capacities, transfigured and valenced by our symbolic languages,
cultures, and religions.
KEY WORDS
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Introduction
One of us has recently offered a strong claim: “Biologically we are just
another ape; mentally we are a whole new phylum of organism” (1).
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So how did this come to be? How does our apparently novel mentality,
and its attendant sense of self, relate to our evolutionary heritage? We offer
here some perspectives on these questions, with a particular focus on the
dynamics of our moral sensibilities.
We begin with the concept of emergence. We point out that in life as we
know it today, biological emergence is undergirded by semiotic (encoding)
systems, and describe how such systems are manifested in single-celled
and multicellular organisms, particularly as they generate cellular
awareness and, in animals, brain-based awareness. We then note that a
unique semiotic system—symbolic language—has evolved in the hominid
lineage, and offer a scenario for the unfolding of that evolutionary process.
We conclude by proposing that a core feature of our mentality is our ability
to access and experience primate states of mind, and that our moral
capacities are rooted in this dynamic. Whereas human transcendence is
commonly configured as a “from-to” trajectory towards the beyond, we
suggest that much of human transcendence entails a circling back to the
“from” dimension and transfiguring it with our symbolic minds.
Emergence
When materials interact, there can arise emergent properties that result
from their relation to one another, generating something more from nothing
but. Interest in this concept among both natural scientists and
philosophers has not surprisingly generated considerable ambiguity in what
is meant by the term emergence. One of us (2) has therefore offered an
inventory of emergent phenomena in the natural world, proposing that
emergence takes three forms (N.B. Ian Barbour also, and ably, describes
these three orders of emergence in his paper for the conference):
• First-Order Emergence: Properties emerge as a consequence of
shape interactions. Examples: The interaction of water molecules
(nothing but) generates a new property, surface tension (something
more); the interaction of glucose molecules (nothing but) generates
starch (something more).
• Second-Order Emergence: Properties emerge as a consequence of
shape interactions played out over time, where what happens next is
highly influenced by what has happened before. Examples: The
formation of a snowflake, where initial and boundary conditions
become amplified in effect over time; the operation of a metabolic
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pathway. In general, complex or “self-organizing” systems display
second-order emergence.
• Third-Order Emergence: Properties emerge as a consequence of
shape, time, and encoded instructions (semiotics). Example: Biology,
where genetic and epigenetic instructions generate materials for and
place constraints upon first- and second-order systems and thereby
specify emergent outcomes called biological traits. These traits then
become substrates for natural selection by virtue of the fact that 1)
their instructions are mutable and replicable, and 2) they endow
organisms with adaptive properties.
Biological Traits as Emergent Phenomena
It is important at the outset to expand upon this concise summary of
third-order emergence and, in particular, set forward what we mean by trait,
natural selection, encoding, and adaptation.
Biological traits are made up of biomolecules, like enzymes and
hormones and ion channels, that interact and play out in space and time.
The difference between traits and complex systems in general is that the
traits are specified by instructions. The shape of an enzyme, and its
capacity for productive shape changes, and the timing of its appearance in
a given cell, and how much of it is made, and what regulates its
interactional possibilities, and the ionic composition of the cytoplasm within
which it operates —these things are not left to chance or to fluctuating
initial conditions or boundary conditions. They are encoded, either in the
genomic (DNA) instructions themselves or in epigenetic instructions (cellcell interactions) that are ulltimately dependent on genomes, such that
pretty much the same outcome—the same emergent trait—occurs with a
quite remarkable degree of reliability. And indeed, to generate a reliable
outcome is what organisms are about. When a species is unable to
generate its emergent properties in a reliable fashion, it either drifts towards
extinction or, via mutation and natural selection, evolves a more reliable
strategy.
Granted that the ultimate substrate for natural selection is the organism
itself, the units of selection are biological traits. Thus natural selection does
not “see” the enzymes, the individual gene products, that catalyze an
organism's energy transduction. Rather, natural selection “sees” the
outcome, the emergent trait we call metabolism. In the same way, natural
selection “sees” an organism's motility and not the contractile and
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regulatory proteins that together allow that motility to happen. Instructions
for a less adaptive metabolism or motility are less likely to spread through a
population than instructions for a more adaptive metabolism or motility, with
the wild-card word “adaptive” having everything to do with the match
between an organism's genomic expectations and the niche wherein it in
fact finds itself. Metabolism and motility are nothing but their constituent
parts. But they are also something more, something new and emergent.
And they are the “stuff” of what an organism is.
With this much background, we can re-visit the definition of third-order
emergence using motility as an example. Our muscles contract and relax
by virtue of regulated interactions between two kinds of proteins, actin and
myosin. Muscle motility can therefore be said to be nothing but
actin/myosin interactions that generate the ability to move (something
more). The actin/myosin system self-organizes in muscle cells using
second-order “rules” which, in turn, are constrained by the first-order shape
relations of the participating proteins. That there exists a selectable
biological trait called actin/myosin-based motility is dependent on, and the
consequence of, there being third-order genetic instructions that specify
and constrain and transmit the parameters for such self-organization.
Motility per se is not an exclusive property of actin/myosin systems. A
number of self organizing systems in the biological world—the bacterial
flagellum, the eukaryotic cilium—generate motility using proteins and
mechanisms that are very different from actin/myosin. Thus motility is
independent of the nothing-buts that serve to generate it, which is true of
emergent properties in general (surface tension is a property not only of
liquid water but of liquids in general). Motility emerges again and again
during evolution because its acquisition is often adaptive for organisms and
hence it is subject to positive natural selection.
The larger point, then, is that third-order systems, by being
remembered/selected and not simply the episodic outcome of unspecified
initial and boundary conditions, have the all-important property that they are
subject to constructive influence. We can talk about evolutionary
“improvements” in motility—about how a particular kind of motility became
better adapted to particular niches via mutation and natural selection of
participating proteins—in a way that we cannot talk about improving
surface tension or improving the meteorological ramifications of a butterfly
flapping its wings in Japan.
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Importantly, then, the onset of third-order emergence defines the onset
of telos on this planet and, for all we now know, in the universe. Creatures
have a purpose, and their traits are for that purpose. What's particularly
important about biological traits is that they are about something.
Metabolism allows an organism to carry out its chemistry; motility allows it
to move towards food and mates and away from toxicity and predators.
There is a point to a trait that we cannot ascribe to a snowflake. A trait, and
the collection of traits that it combines with to generate an organism, has a
purpose, namely, to allow the organism to carry on (and thereby transmit
the instructions, albeit humans alone are cognizant of this aspect of things).
Organisms of different sorts may inhabit other planets in the universe, but
the organisms on this planet, and their inevitable evolution given its
inhomogeneous environment, are steeped in teleology.
Emergent Semiotic Systems
Biology is not only a physical/chemical science but also a semiotic
science, a science wherein representation and significance are central
elements. Semiotic systems, by definition, are emergent: virtually any
material property (nothing but) can become endowed with semiotic
information (something more). Given our goal of understanding something
about the nature of human minds, it is apt to begin by considering how
semiotic systems undergird the construction and perpetuation of biological
organisms in general.
At the heart of any semiotic system is the “sign” relationship—the ability
of something to “stand for” something else, to “mean” something else, to
carry interpretable information. So, in DNA, the codon ATG means that the
amino acid methionine should be placed in a particular position in a protein.
The hormone insulin, binding to and activating a receptor on a fat cell,
means that blood sugar levels are high. And a molecule diffusing from a
decaying food source and binding to and activating a receptor on the
surface of an amoeba means that the food source is nearby. The molecule
is not the food source itself but rather a sign indicating its proximity. In each
case, a sophisticated biochemistry is recruited to translate/interpret the
sign's meaning: Numerous “translation factors” (ribosomes, transfer RNAs)
are involved in going from ATG to methionine, and complex signaltransduction pathways instruct the fat cell and the amoeba that certain
information has been perceived and that certain responses are indicated.
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Awareness in Single-Celled and Multi-Celled Organisms
At this point we need to lift up some important distinctions between the
awareness systems of single-celled vs. multi-celled organisms.
Most organisms on the planet today, and doubtless the only organisms
on the planet for the first several billion years, were single-celled
organisms, of which bacteria, yeasts, and amoebae are the most familiar.
Each inherits a species-specific genome (a collection of genes) that
specifies traits suited to negotiating the niche that the organism expects to
encounter, and if the match between genome and niche is in fact is a good
one, the organism will be able to grow, copy its genome, and divide into
two daughter organisms with one genome apiece. Many of the encoded
traits make use of receptors (like the amoeba's receptors for decaying-food
molecules) that detect relevant signs in the environment and convey their
meaning to the organism. These systems can be said to mediate cellular
awareness.
Multicellular organisms, originating at least 600 million years ago,
partition out the job of being alive to two different kinds of cells: The germline cells (eggs and sperm) engage in transmitting genomes to daughter
generations, and the remaining somatic cells engage in growth and nichenegotiation. The somatic cells, in turn, go on to sub-specialize in the
execution of particular traits—fat cells specialize in glucose storage and
heat insulation, muscle cells specialize in motility, and so on—and each is
again studded with receptors—insulin receptors on fat cells,
neurotransmitter receptors on muscle cells—that mediate cell-type-specific
modalities of cellular awareness.
The amoeba, then, is basically a one-man band, whereas a multicellular
organism is a very large orchestra. Orchestras require conductors, and
while the task of coordinating the traits of a multicellular animal is carried
out at many levels, the brain is unquestionably the maestro. The brain
receives a vast array of inputs/signs about the environment via various
kinds of sensory neurons; it also receives a vast array of inputs from the
rest of the body about “how things are going,” signs—often hormones or
neurotransmitters—that mean pain or hunger or fear or sexual attraction; it
then integrates this information and oversees the resultant responses we
call emotionally-valenced behavior. We can call these semiotic feats brainbased awareness.
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Particularly distinctive about brain-based awareness is its indexical
semiotic capacity. When a sensory system is stimulated, it proceeds to
make synaptic connections in the brain with 1) neural pathways that
encode memories of previous encounters with that kind of stimulus, 2)
pathways that encode its various emotional and instinctual valences, as
well as 3) numerous learned associations between that stimulus and others
that impact on its meaning. So, for a dog, the visual stimulus of a food dish
will elicit all manner of memories (previous meals), instincts (hunger),
emotional states (anxiety about being hungry, anticipation of pleasure in
being fed) and learned associations (the human food-provider, the sound of
the food bag opening) that are brain-integrated and then converted into
some sort of coherent behavioral response.
In the end, brain-based awareness is nothing but cellular awareness.
Each neuron is a cell, and neurons utilize the same kinds of receptors and
hormones and ion channels and signal transduction pathways to mediate
perception and synaptic transmission that are found in single-celled
organisms and in fat cells and muscle cells. But brain-based awareness is
quintessentially also something more: The indexical possibilities of learning
and memory and emotional valence are in theory limited only by the kinds
of stimuli that a brain is equipped and motivated to perceive. With all due
respect for the highly adaptive hormonal strategies used by plants to
integrate their multicellularity, we would say that it is not just
anthropocentrism that motivates our admiration for brains. Brains are
inherently amazing.
How Do Mammalian Brains Change?
Not yet mentioned, but key to our story, is the fact that during the
course of evolution, brains underwent a major transition in their mode of
genetic specification. Whereas the nervous system of each and every
worm of the species Caenorhabditis elegans contains 302 neurons that are
found in identical locations and mediate identical synaptic pathways, the
brain of a mammal contains some 100 billion neurons, plus or minus,
whose locations and synaptic relationships are established “on the fly.”
Genetic scripts endow the neurons that grow up into the embryonic
cranium with general instructions as to where they are going and what kind
of neurotransmitters they are able to produce, but most of what happens
after that is elicited by the other neurons they encounter, the growth factors
they secrete and perceive, and the signals they transmit to one another as
they make contact and move past. When a neuron picks up on a
7

developmental cue and differentiates along the lines indicated by that cue,
its resultant properties then influence the neurons with which it next
interacts. That is to say, mammalian brain development is robustly
“epigenetic”: genes set the process up and continuously participate in
differentiation events – the genes by no means go away -- but most of the
information is exchanged at the level of cell-cell interactions.
The epigenetic course of brain development is clearly reliable: if one
were to examine 100 fetal mouse brains, one would find their overall
organization to be strikingly similar. But it can also be said to be
underdetermined in the sense that if one were able to analyze any two of
these brains at a neuron-by-neuron level, there'd be lots of differences—as
contrasted with two worms.
When a developmental process is as underdetermined and
epigenetically encoded as is mammalian neurogenesis, then small changes
can generate major differences in outcome. That is, the process takes on
features of second-order emergence—what happens next can be highly
influenced by what has happened before—and simple mutations can have
large-scale downstream consequences and hence large-scale evolutionary
consequences. We can consider three ways that this can happen.
• Parts of the brain may change in size. A single gene mutation can
result, often quite indirectly, in an increase or a decrease in the
number of cell divisions that a given lineage undergoes during the
course of embryology. Mutations of this kind routinely generate
heritable differences in the overall size of an organism, for example,
and the evolutionary consequences of such changes can be
significant. This is particularly true for loosely-determined mammalian
brains, where an additional doubling of certain neurons provisions the
brain with a “new set of players,” and hence new connective
opportunities, while a halving of such neurons means that their former
potential synaptic partners will probe the “brain space” in search of
new connective opportunities.
• Brain pathways may degrade when they are no longer under
selection. For example, when fish or mammals come to inhabit caves
or underground niches where there is no light, natural selection no
longer operates to maintain their visual systems. Therefore,
mutations that compromise visual acuity are not selected against—no
one can see anything anyhow—and the animals eventually become
heritably blind.
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• Degraded pathways may reconfigure. Figure 1 compares the brain of
a sighted rodent and a blind mole rat. In the sighted species, the
visual cortex, heavily innervated with optic-nerve input, mediates
vision, whereas in the blind species, lacking optic input, this same
region of the brain has been “taken over” by neurons delivering
auditory and tactile input. Not only does this illustrate the
underdetermination of mammalian brains—there is no hard-wired
“visual cortex” per se but rather a cortical region that is induced to
mediate vision when programmed by optic input and to mediate touch
and hearing when programmed by tactile and auditory input. It also
illustrates the strong role that natural selection can play in shaping
brains, since the enhanced hearing and touching afforded by these
new cortical connections are presumably adaptive for the blind mole
rat in negotiating its underground niche.

Figure 1. Innervation of the cortex in a typical rodent and in a blind
mole rat inhabiting an underground niche. (From Deacon, T., The Symbolic
Species, 1997)
Mental Traits Shared by Human and Non-Human Primates
So what about human brains?
Figure 2 illustrates our family tree. Some 5 million years ago—a short
span in the ~600 million years of animal evolution—a common ancestor
gave rise to 3 lineages: the human, the chimpanzee, and the bonobo. The
mental traits shared by these 3 kinds of animals can be assumed, as a first
pass, to have been present as well in our common ancestor, whereas traits
found in only one lineage can be assumed, again as a first pass, to have
evolved as lineage-specific events.
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Figure 2. Family tree of the great apes Common ancestor is circled.
(From Wrangham, R. and D. Peterson, Demonic Males, Houghton Mifflin,
1996)
Humans, chimps, and bonobos share numerous mental traits which, by
this reasoning, would have been displayed as well by our common
ancestor. We are all highly intelligent animals with impressive abilities to
learn by both experience and imitation and to remember what we have
learned. We display a similar range of temperaments generated by similar
emotional systems: primatologists who come to know chimps and bonobos
can readily describe one as shy, another as extroverted, another as
impatient, and so on. We are all similarly dependent on maternal care and
group nurture for appropriate mental development, with deprivation
generating a similar syndrome of impairments. And finally, we are all social
animals, living in highly structured groups with similar organizing principles:
As considered more extensively in ref. 3, these include a robust attention to
social hierarchy; a preoccupation with the nurture of the young (also called
kin altruism); skillful engagement in strategic reciprocity (“I'll scratch your
back if you scratch mine”; also called reciprocal altruism) and the attendant
formation of friendships and alliances; a hostility towards outgroups
(xenophobia); and an endowment of the pro-social capacity we can
generically call empathy.
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Preston and de Waal have recently published a comprehensive review
of the evidence for empathy in non-human primates (4), and the findings
are convincing: Co-existent with the self-interest inherent in all organisms
and necessary for their survival (3), and co-existent as well with such
“negative” capacities as aggression (considered briefly at the end of this
article), primates are disposed to help one another out in the service of
group stability, to be tolerant, to offer forgiveness and consolation and forge
reconciliation. Countering arguments that “being nice” fails to foster
transmission of one's genes and that any genetic disposition towards
empathy would be quickly trumped by winner-take-all “cheats” is the
compelling argument that when survival is dependent on group coherence,
as is by definition the case for robustly social animals like the primates,
there occurs positive selection for the capacity to sense and respond to the
emotional status of others in the troop, and negative selection against
sociopathic behavior.
Mental Traits That Are Uniquely Human: A Scenario for their Emergence
It goes without saying that humans have many unique mental traits, but
we would argue that one trait is foundational to the rest: Humans learn not
only by imitation and experience but also by accessing information from
cultures that are encoded in symbolic languages. It's not so much that we
have more of chimp-like intelligence; rather, we also have a different kind of
intelligence.
In the following paragraphs we present a scenario for the co-evolution
of language, culture, and symbolic human minds; many of these ideas are
presented in greater depth in refs. 1 and 5. The scenario is by definition a
speculation—what actually happened may never be fully known—but we
find the scenario heuristic, helping us to focus in on what's distinctive about
human mentality, and some of its propositions should eventually be
amenable to empirical evaluation.
Niche Construction
To understand the role of culture in human evolution, it is helpful to start
with the beaver. Beavers exhibit the remarkable trait of damming up
streams to form ponds and then inhabiting the ponds, thereby protecting
themselves from predators. This trait is clearly “hard-wired:” If the sound of
running water is broadcast to captive beavers, they proceed to pile sticks
on top of the speaker. It also exemplifies niche construction: Beavers are
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adapted to the ponds that they themselves create; they are selected for
their ability to produce the niches upon which they depend.
And so it is with the human. The niche to which we are adapted—
human culture—is a niche that we ourselves construct; we are selected for
our ability both to produce and to inhabit culture-based niches. Since
human culture is encoded in and acquired by symbolic languages, this
means we have been selected for our symbolic minds in the same way that
beavers have been selected for their dam-building skills.
Co-Evolution of Culture, Language, and Brain
Culture, language, and symbolic brains that manipulate language have
co-evolved, by our scenario, in a constructive, accretive fashion: If a more
facile symbolic manipulation were made possible by a new kind of brain
configuration which in turn allowed better access to adaptive kinds of
culture-based understandings, there would occur selection for such a trait
which, in turn, would generate hominids yet more dependent on culture for
survival and hence more likely to be selected for further “improvements” in
their language facility. While a number of speculations have been offered
as to why/how this might all have gotten started in the first place, we are
agnostic on this topic and simply point out that once a co-evolutionary cycle
like this gets set up, for whatever reason, it can take on a life of its own and
can evolve very rapidly.
This being said, there remain many questions as to how it all might
have played out. We next suggest a dynamic that could have been operant.
Masking, Degradation, and Reconfiguration
As we saw in our story of the blind mole rat, a trait that is no longer
under selection, like vision in darkness, is prone to degradation. This is not
because the darkness “causes” the degradation, of course. Mutations
leading to a loss of function occur on a regular basis—most changes in
information systems result in information loss, as per the second law of
thermodynamics. As long as the trait is under selection, degradative
changes are winnowed out, but when selection backs off, they persist and
accumulate.
Selection can become attenuated when the trait is no longer needed,
like vision in darkness. It can also attenuate when the trait's function comes

12

to be provided by the environment, rendering the trait redundant, a dynamic
known as masking.
To illustrate masking, we can consider the story of how ascorbic acid
came to become vitamin C. Most organisms are genetically programmed to
synthesize their own ascorbic acid, which is necessary for their survival.
Ancestral apes in our lineage, however, started to eat ripe fruits, which are
rich in ascorbic acid. As a consequence, mutations compromising the
enzymes involved in ascorbic acid biosynthesis were not debilitating
because abundant ascorbic acid was already coming in from the diet; that
is, the mutations were masked from natural selection. Hence, as the
pathways degraded, ascorbic acid became a vitamin: Chimps and humans
now must obtain it from the outside. Applying this concept to human
evolution, we can posit that to the extent that culture came to provide
hominids with useful information from the outside, any genetically
established programs specifying overlapping kinds of information in the
brain would be similarly masked from selection and would therefore
become prone to degradation. As this occurred, hominids would become
increasingly dependent on—indeed, addicted to—cultural information for
their survival.
We can now circle back to our consideration of brain evolution, recall
that degraded brain programs tend to become reconfigured to support
alternative adaptive traits, and posit that parts of the hominid brain became
reconfigured for language. Since the neural basis for language capability is
not now understood, it is not yet possible to point to novel features of
human brains, and absent from chimp brains, that illustrate the physical
basis of this emergent skill. Still, it is by definition the case that to the extent
that any degraded programs became re-configured for linguistic operations,
this would allow better access to the cultures upon which hominids had
become dependent, meaning that such degradation/reconfiguration events
would be adaptive and the genetic programs that allow such brains to
emerge would be subject to positive selection.
We can further recall that the human brain is larger than the chimp brain
in regions called the "neocortex," and that brain enlargement generates the
opportunity for the emergence of novel neural configurations. Figure 3
illustrates a key feature of the neocortex, namely, its relative independence
from
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Figure 3. Chimp and human brains. Peripheral input/output
constraints are equivalently strong for their shared cortical domains (M,
motor, S, sensory/tactile, V, visual, A, auditory) whereas much of the
neocortex (P, parietal lobe, T, temporal lobe, Pf, prefrontal cortex, C,
cerebellum) is less constrained.
input signals from the periphery (e.g. sense organs, viscera) and output to
the periphery (muscles, viscera). That is, much of the neocortex operates
independently, "talking to itself," as it were, with the highly enlarged
prefrontal cortex connected exclusively to other regions of the brain.
Notwithstanding the fact that it is not yet understood how language is
generated, most neuroscientists assume that these novel self-referent
regions of the brain will prove to be involved.
To summarize, then, we can offer an evolutionary model for the
emergence of human minds:
• Culture has masked the need for certain genetically encoded
(“phylotypic”) primate mental pathways, and these have degraded.
• The brain enlarged to generate novel self-referent domains.
• The freed-up and novel “brain space” has been (re-)configured to
generate minds adept at learning symbolic language and hence
acquiring cultural information.
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What Does Symbolic Language Accomplish?
So what's so special about symbolic language? One of us has written a
500-page book (1) on this subject. Therefore, in lifting up a few key
concepts , we are by definition leaving out most of the story.
Symbolic representation is a novel emergent semiotic capacity found
only in the human (and in machines designed by humans). The nothing but
is the indexical primate brain, highly sophisticated and versatile, that we
admired earlier. The something more is the ability of the human brain to
use symbols (words) to refer to indexes and to sets of indexes, and to use
syntax to indicate the relationships of these words to one another. As
stressed in The Symbolic Species, these operations are not likely to have
evolved, as some have proposed, via adding some “language box” to a
primate mind so that it can manipulate languages that are somehow “out
there” to be discovered. Rather, there likely occurred a co-evolution of
language and brain such that symbolic languages were selected for their
ability to be learnable by children's brains and children's brains were
selected for their ability to learn symbolic languages. If we add to the mix
the proposed selective effects exerted by niche construction and cultural
addiction, and the proposed degradation/reconfiguration dynamics
facilitated by cultural masking, we come away with the conviction that the
evolution of human minds can be modeled in plausible evolutionary terms,
and hence need not be relegated to the miraculous or mysterious.
Nevertheless, if brains are amazing, the human brain is flat-out
astonishing, most especially because the language user can generate
constructions that are independent of “lower” levels of reference, meaning
that the words themselves come to define a virtual reality that has a life of
its own. When challenged we can pause, “unpack” our symbols and syntax,
and examine their antecedents, but for most purposes we inhabit the
linguistic constructions themselves.
Words can function as straightforward signs, but most words can also
be used to encode and convey what we call concepts or ideas, pointing to
complex sets of indexes that are integrated via complex syntactical
relationships. Moreover, since these concepts inhabit a virtual reality with a
life of its own, we can and do engage in conceptual blending, mixing and
matching and transfiguring concepts in an orgy of semiotic freedom,
constrained only by whether what emerges has some sort of meaning (the
definitional constraint on semiosis). As our cultures have evolved to harbor
and convey increasingly sophisticated concepts and ideas, moreover, the
15

criterion as to what-has-meaning has also lost its obligation to real-world
antecedents: Whole new kinds of meaning permeate the virtual world that
we call the imagination.
And now, a central claim. We would argue, as have many others, that
our sense of “self,” what we will call human self-awareness or the narrative
self, is made possible by symbolic language. That is, when we say that we
are aware of our thoughts and ideas and plans and memories, we do this
using symbolic constructions. It may be possible to have a thought without
linguistic representation, but we only know that we have had one when it is
self-represented in symbolic form. This claim is made in full awareness of
its attendant ambiguities, such as “how do we know that a dog is not also
self-aware?” or “what about the pre-linguistic human infant?” While we find
these questions intriguing, they fail to vitiate our sense that once language
is in place, there emerges not only symbolic reference but also symbolic
self-reference, a narrative self, in the sense that we humans experience
that experience.
How symbolic self-reference “works” is as elusive as how language
itself “works”. But if neuroscientists were tomorrow to publish a definitive
description of the biophysical/neural basis for human self-awareness, the
account would be unlikely to have much impact on our understanding of
our mental theaters for the simple reason that we are already expert at
what they are like. Moreover, our self-awareness seems to be independent
of mechanism or materiality. As much as we are able to acknowledge the
embodiment of our ideas and feelings, we experience them as operating in
a disembodied virtual realm. That’s just the way self happens to come to
us.
Emergent phenomena are not prefigured. They come for free,
apparently out of thin air. And so it is with our selves. Our thoughts and
actions are determinate but not predetermined. Self and experience are
both entirely physical and entirely representational. What a person is and
what a person is conscious of are representations, and representations—
although nothing but physical objects and events—are something more as
well.
Our very selves, then, are by this rubric emergent phenomena. It is the
very possibility of being a locus of experience, and feeling, and perpetual
coming into being, that is a person. This emergentist view of who we are,
neither radically reductionist nor setting us apart in some disconnected
realm, is for us a thrilling way to ground our existence.
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Experiencing Our Primate Minds Symbolically
No question about it: Our symbolic minds allow us to access mental
experiences, like mathematics and aesthetics and spiritual intimations, that
we have every reason to believe are novel to the human, unique to the
human. Our poets, artists, philosophers and religious leaders provision us
with rich and provocative descriptions of these experiences, and our
cultures allow us to transmit, retrieve, and build upon their seminal insights.
In what follows we are in no way suggesting that these insights are not of
utmost importance to what it means to be human.
But we suggest that it is also of utmost importance that we not lose
track of our mental evolutionary antecedents. To say that our brains have
undergone critical reconfigurations as they evolved their capabilities for
symbolic (self)-representation is not to say that our common-ancestor
brains were left in the dustbin. As noted earlier, we share strong cognitive
and emotional homologies with our primate cousins, and to the extent that
degradation/reconfiguration went into generating our capacity for language,
it occurred in the midst of a primate brain that remains very much a primate
brain (c.f. Figure 3). Any perspective on the human condition that brushes
this fact aside is an incomplete perspective—indeed, we would say that it is
an impoverished perspective.
A common response to this interface is to propose a de facto dualism.
Yes, it is acknowledged, much of who we are has primate antecedents, but,
given our emergent minds, our rationality, our spiritual yearnings, and our
culturally encoded meaning systems, we somehow have the wherewithal to
transcend these antecedents and operate in a set-apart matrix of humanspecific truths. Indeed, this dualism is inherent in the claim, loosely called
the naturalistic fallacy, that you can't get an ought from an is. We may well
inherit an (often awkward) evolutionary legacy, but it has no a priori claim
on our modes of valuation and, in particular, on our ethical codifications.
An alternative to such forms of dualism, and one that we find more
germinative and satisfying, is the notion that one of the things that we do
with our symbolic minds is to experience our primate minds symbolically.
Our primate minds have not gone away (albeit some phylotypic “instincts”
have been lost and perhaps reconfigured), nor are they experienced as
apes would experience them. They are experienced as experienced by
human minds: Symbolically.
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This notion can be fruitfully applied to many traits as, for example, the
experiences we call our sexuality. In the remaining sections of this paper
we will develop the notion in the context of morality. The thesis: Given that
we have evolved from an intensely social lineage, we are uniquely aware of
what it feels like to be pro-social, and it is this awareness of what it feels
like to be moral—this moral experience—that undergirds and motivates the
actions of a moral person.
Moral Experience
Moral experience, we suggest, entails a coupling of our rich heritage of
social orientation with our ability to symbolically represent it to ourselves.
During this coupling, the experience of our pro-social capacities, and their
role in affecting action, is radically transformed, and what emerges is a
major augmentation of our social heritage. We are able to apply these
amplified pro-social capacities to experiences and imaginings and modes
of action that are no longer constrained by evolutionary precedents and
classes of phylotypic stimuli. Indeed, our capacity for conceptual blending
allows a synthesis of moral understandings and emotional experiences that
would otherwise be mutually exclusive.
It follows that morality is not something that humans acquire via cultural
instruction, albeit, as we discuss later, culture serves to complement the
process in important ways. Rather, we are lead to moral experience and
insight. Real morality can’t be forced on people, nor can they be fooled into
having it, nor do they just act on their ‘moral instincts.’ Real morality does
not simply bubble up from beneath, nor is it imposed from the outside. In
each one of us, it must be discovered anew. The discovery process may
require great mental and emotional effort and may bloom only in the right
climate, but human beings see morality, recognize it, regardless of what it
is that they want or need or love or hate or feel compelled to do.
We can put flesh on these abstractions by considering the psychopath.
A psychopath can negotiate hierarchy and execute strategic reciprocity
without difficulty, and can learn, and simulate, moral behavior when this
suits his purposes. But, be it by inborn error or brain injury or childhood
deprivation, he lacks the capacity to experience moral experience, to feel
anything in the way of empathy, to put himself in another’s shoes. Morality
without empathy is by definition oxymoronic. Therefore, his simulation of
morality is strictly instrumental, and, in extreme cases, he is able to say
things like “I killed that kid because I’d never killed a kid before and I
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wanted to see what it felt like.” The tragedy of the psychopath reminds us
that without access to moral experience we are no longer fully human.
Virtues, Pro-Social Orientation, and Moral Experience
The notion that human morality is located within moral experience is not
a new insight. It is embedded, for example, in the thinking of Aristotle, who
wrote: “We have the virtues neither by nor contrary to our nature. We are
fitted by our nature to receive them.” Subsequent philosophers have
continued to explore this approach, developing a tradition known as virtue
ethics (see, e.g., ref. 6).
So what are the virtues, and how do they relate to the thesis that
morality entails the human experience of pro-social orientations? Four of
the virtues that appear on most lists—humaneness/compassion,
fairmindedness, care, and reverence—can be thought of as related to four
of the inherited pro-social capacities that we listed earlier—empathy,
strategic reciprocity, nurture, and hierarchy (see also refs.3 and 7). We
develop these correspondences briefly below in order to indicate how this
line of thinking might be pursued in a more complete analysis.
Morality without empathy is oxymoronic, as we have said, and the
words humaneness and compassion are among those used to describe the
emergent way that humans access, experience, and manifest the empathic
nature inherent in our heritage. We come to grasp that to put oneself in
another's shoes is not only something that applies to our kin or friends or
social group. Indeed, as our vocabularies mature and our ability to
manipulate concepts complexifies, we become able to articulate empathic
connection with such abstractions as “life itself” or “the planet Earth.”
Moreover, we can engage in conceptual blending and configure empathy in
radically new ways, as in “Love Thine Enemy.”
If humaneness/compassion can be said to entail the symbolic
accession of empathy, then fairmindedness strikes us as entailing a
symbolic synthesis—a conceptual blending—of humaneness and strategic
reciprocity. Once someone takes on board the notion that for every winner
there is a loser, and once someone has the experience of putting oneself in
the shoes of the loser and empathizing with her, it becomes evident that
there is another way to think about these social interactions, namely, that
more important than winning or losing is that the outcome be fair. Strategic
reciprocity fused with humaneness emerges as a sense of justice, a
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centerpiece of moral philosophy. And again, we can complexify further and
articulate a sense of ecological justice.
The third virtue, care, inherent as well in such concepts as
responsibility, commitment and kindness, emerges from the strong primate
sense of nurture, not only of one's own offspring but also, in a lineage
wherein paternity is uncertain, of all the youngsters in the troop. Primate
nurturance entails not only protection and provisioning but also relationship,
play, and affection, and it is this capacity, we suggest, that transfigures as
the capacity to care about one another and about larger concepts like
ecosystems and future generations. Compassion and care clearly overlap,
but care is the more active noun and emerges, we suggest, from its own
set of primate antecedents.
The fourth virtue, reverence, can be modeled as a complex emergent
manifestation of our orientation in hierarchy. Reverence, in its mindful
manifestations (7), describes the capacity to carry the sense that we inhabit
contexts that are larger and more important than ourselves, to which we
accord awe and respect and gratitude. We come to speak of reverence for
our leaders, and leaders to speak with reverence of their followers. We
orient ourselves in reverent family life and reverent communities, and offer
honor to revered understandings in ceremony and ritual (8). Many find
orientation in a theistic reverence, while others become besotted with
reverence for the natural world, the emergent material world, in all its
wondrous manifestations and evolutionary history (9). The human capacity
for reverence, we suggest, may represent a transfigured version of our
innate grounding in social valuation, endowing us as well with a sense of
humility that gives us some help, at least, in warding off the perils of hubris.
Moral Motivation
To have moral experience is, of course, quite a different matter from
acting in a moral way, particularly when it is against one’s self-interest to do
so. We may see what is right but not be motivated to act on it.
The all-too-common practice, now and probably throughout human
history, is to provide moral motivation by rewarding “good” thoughts and
behavior and punishing “bad,” as in “Santa knows if you’ve been good or
bad so be good for goodness sake” or “If you do that you will be punished
by the gods/ancestors.” This practice turns morality into a commodity that
can be bartered, a substrate for self-interested strategic reciprocity, an
entity that fills the Christmas stocking or assures a glorious afterlife. The
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problem with this, of course, is that humans quickly notice that there are
other strategies that also fill the stocking, like deception and greed, and that
these are in fact more reliable strategies. The commodification of morality
is, to our mind, one of the most dangerous things that we do, quite as
dangerous as fundamentalism or moral relativism.
But if moral motivation is not to be provided by punishment/reward
systems, then where is it to come from? Aristotle makes an interesting
claim here, which is that “virtuous conduct gives gladness to the lover of
virtue.” Note that he is not saying that virtue brings gladness to the virtuous,
but rather to the lover of virtue.
One way to think about Aristotle's claim is in the context of what 18th
century philosophers like Shaftesbury and Hume called moral beauty. The
idea is that we access and enjoy moral beauty along the lines that we
access and enjoy aesthetic beauty, where in both cases the rewards are
both private and ineffable. Importantly, the lover of virtue is made glad not
only by experiencing moral beauty in himself, which could carry a lurking
reward motivation as in “this will assure my place in heaven,” but also by
witnessing moral beauty in others—New York firefighters, for example, or
persons who reach a fair outcome to a conflict. We say that moral
experience “warms the heart,” often reflexively placing our hand over our
heart as we say it; we say that we are uplifted. Indeed, those who selfidentify as worldly sophisticates may feel somewhat sheepish to find their
eyes filling with tears at some experience of moral beauty, and this can be
dismissed all too quickly as sentimentality. Before dismissing
sentimentality, we might first want to deepen our understanding of what it
entails.
To invoke as a moral motivator the heart-warming sense of gladness
that we experience when we encounter moral beauty is, on the one hand,
to say very little since we know so little about what it means to perceive
beauty, be it aesthetic or moral. But we do know that we seek such
experiences and find them meaningful, and to our mind there is much to
explore along these lines, particularly from the perspective of helping our
children to access morality for its attendant sense of beauty rather than
because it promises a full stocking.
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Moral Ideals
Our focus on the “bottom-up” sources of moral experience has
seemingly ignored our earlier focus on the importance of human culture, a
deficit we will now address.
Cultural traditions include the writings of numerous philosophers and
theologians who derive moral constructs from a priori rational or “revealed”
premises and offer resultant codes of ethical conduct. Many of their insights
and codifications—the Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative, the Veil of
Ignorance, the Eight-Fold Path—robustly complement the understandings
that are accessed during the process of moral self-discovery. But we would
suggest that the core contribution of culture along this axis is that it
encodes and presents to us moral ideals that guide our moral maturation
and stimulate our moral motivation.
Moral ideals come to us in artistic/narrative form. We hear stories or see
paintings or sing songs about people who are good, who do the right thing
at the right time in the right way, and we lock in, we sense the
correspondences with our own pro-social biases. We are “inspired” to be
like them.
All religious traditions, throughout the ages, rely on artistic narrative to
convey moral ideals, to educate the emotions. Moreover, these narratives
function independently of the metaphysical claims of the tradition: a
Christian has no problem accessing the compassion that inheres in the
images and stories about the Buddha, nor the reverence that permeates a
Native American tribal ceremony. Indeed, a recent survey of world religions
reports a deep congruence in moral ideals despite vast differences in
metaphysical premises (10). And while of course religious institutions, like
all institutions, are vulnerable to being hijacked under stressful
circumstances into advocating the likes of violence and cruelty, they return
to their pro-social narratives once the stressful circumstances abate.
Moral experience, we suggest, is the wellspring of our virtue—without it
we are doomed to psychopathology—but once it is perceived, which seems
to begin early in childhood, we embark on a lifelong journey, fraught with
encounters with fear, greed, hubris, prejudice, and self-absorption, wherein
we seek to act in accordance with the beauty of the good. This journey is
described, in countless metaphors, by our religious traditions, and whether
persons encounter these metaphors as the word of the gods or, as we do,
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the word of the best that resides within the human, our journey would be
barren without them.
Most importantly, moral experience is not only something that we
develop within our own beings. We also share this experience with one
another, and it binds us together. There are many ways that communities
are held together via “straight” kin altruism and hierarchy and strategic
reciprocity; indeed, these are robustly operant in our political and economic
forms of social stabilization. But our shared moral experiences generate as
well a thirst for moral communities. Humaneness, fairmindedness, care,
and reverence can be considered to represent cardinal virtues in the sense
that a human community mindfully infused with these qualities can be
described as a moral community—within which, we believe, can best
flourish our emergent, and most astonishing, minds and selves.
A-Sociality
To look at the primates and lift up only their pro-social capacities is of
course to tell only part of the story. Self-interest is central to the nature of
all organisms (3), and always lurking in the wings of primate self-interest
are its “darker” manifestations. It is here that the project of naturalizing
morality encounters for many its insurmountable hurdle. When we
remember that apes are also observed to injure and even kill one another,
to use force in sex, to be cruel and rejecting, and to display robust
xenophobia, we become distinctly uncomfortable, and invoke with a
shudder the specter of the criminal basing his legal defense on the claim
that “my genes made me do it.”
A full consideration of the interplay between self-interest and prosociality, particularly as each plays out in its emergent manifestations, is
well beyond the scope of this essay, but a few observations are germane.
First, it is important to point out that the existence of self-interest, and its
darker forms however defined, does not negate the existence of prosociality. Pro-social capacities are not just the absense of a-social
capacities. They have lives of their own.
We can then recall that primates, both nonhuman and human, most
often engage in a-social behaviors when they are subjected to stress, and
particularly to prolonged stress. Under these circumstances, we hunker
down and engage in self-interested survival patterns, the default behavior
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of all creatures, and these often take forms that are antithetical to prosociality.
One way to stack the deck in favor of morality, therefore, is to
ameliorate the conditions wherein humans find themselves physically or
emotionally impoverished, threatened, defeated, abused, humiliated,
lonely, or insecure. Such conditions foster the dehumanization and
demonization of those identified as the “cause” of our frustrations, allowing
them to become targets of exclusion and brutality (11). Such conditions
also render humans vulnerable to rigid fundamentalisms—many carrying
morality labels—that activate our fear and greed in their promises of
deliverance.
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